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resulting in a new trial which could have been prevented by granting
the motion to strike. The second exception is the use of the motion to
strike to eliminate allegations in the complaint which are not legally
relevant and thus prevent a waste of time and effort by the defense in
preparation to meet those allegations. Here, then, are two reasons for
the motion to strike.
The rules also provide that an insufficient defense shall be the
ground for the motion to strike. This gTound is here considered separately as it is a replacement for a use of the extinct demurrer. Demurrers,
including the demurrer to an answer, have been abolished.3 0 The effect
of such an abolition was to deprive the plaintiff of a means with which
to test the legal sufficiency of a defense. The provision that the motion
to strike may be used to have insufficient defenses stricken cures this
deprivation.
Therefore, the established practice of the courts operating under a
system of rules from which the new Wyoming Rules have been formed,
shows that there is to be much less reliance on these "dilatory" motions
and that they are generally disfavored. True, they are still available
to the Wyoming lawyer, but they are to be used only in a narrow and
restricted sense. A great deal of time and expense involved in litigation
may be saved if these motions are not used unnecessarily but are kept
within the established limits. The number of decisions on these motions
in the federal courts began decreasing greatly after the rules had been
in use for a decade, and there are now considerably fewer decisions on
these motions. The Wyoming lawyer will be very much ahead if he
looks to the later federal decisions on these motions and plans his course
of action in the light of these decisions and the interest of his client in
obtaining less expensive and speedier litigation.
LEROY

V.

AMEN

COUNTERCLAIMS
One of the changes in pleading procedure that has resulted from the
adoption of the new rules of civil procedure is in the handling of counterclaims.
Prior to the adoption of the new rules, the pleading of counterclaims
posed few problems to the Wyoming practitioner. Since 1939, the Wyoming code' has provided in effect that the defendant could plead as a
counterclaim any cause of action existing in his favor against the plaintiff.
There are two things to note about this statute: there were no restrictions
as to the kind of relief that could be sought in a counterclaim, and the
30.
1.

Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7 (a).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 3-1313 (1945).
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pleading of a counterclaim was permissive; that is, the defendant had a
choice to plead the counterclaim or make it the subject of an independent
action. However, the code further provided 2 that if the defendant failed
to set up a counterclaim which existed in his favor, he would be precluded
from recovering costs against the plaintiff in a subsequent action. This
was the only penalty for failure to plead a counterclaim under the code.
The statute in operation prior to 1939 was somewhat limiting as to
the pleading of counterclaims. 3 This statute provided in effect that
counterclaims must arise out of the same transaction or contract set forth
in the plaintiff's petition. The 1939 amendment 4 liberalized the pleading
of counterclaims by removing the requirement that they arise out of the
same transaction and went one step further by providing that counterclaims need not diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the plaintiff
and could ask for relief different in kind. This amendment should have
removed all barriers to the pleading of a counterclaim. However, the idea
still persisted after 1939 that a counterclaim in an action for replevin
must meet the issue of possession, emphasizing the language of the somewhat restrictive statute in effect prior to 1939.5 The pre-1939 rule was
reiterated in Yellowstone Sheep Co. v. Ellis,6 decided after the adoption
of the liberalized amendment which supposedly removed all bars to the
permissive pleading of counterclaims. The court in this case said that "a
counterclaim in order to be such [in replevin] must in some way affect the
plaintiff's right and meet the issue of possession." 7 This decision seems to
go directly in the teeth of the statute which provided that the counterclaim
need not defeat the recovery sought by the plaintiff and could be different
in kind. In any event, the rule which should have been abolished in 1939
should finally be put to rest by the adoption of the new rules. The leading
case to illustrate this point is probably Abraham v. Selig s in which the
court said, "Rule 13 (c) [permissive counterclaims] places no procedural
limitations on the type of claim which may be interposed as a counterclaim." 9

The adoption of the new rules has also changed the handling of
counterclaims in other respects. There are now two types of counterclaims
where previously there was just one. Rule 13 (a) provides in effect that
if the counterclaim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence then
2.
3.
4.
5.

Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 3-1314 (1945).
Wyo. Rev. Stat. § 89-1016 (1931).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 3-1313 (1945).
Schlessinger v. Cook, 9 Wyo. 256, 62 Pac. 152 (1900) ; Jones v. Parker, 39 Wyo. 423,
273 Pac. 687 (1929).
6. 55 Wyo. 63, 96 P.2d 895 (1939).
7. Id. at 84, 96 P.2d at 902.
8. 29 F.Supp. 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
9. Id. at 52. One type of claim however may not be the subject of a counterclaim
under either rule 13 (a) or 13 (b). Actions which might arise out of bringing the
main action or out of allegations in the pleading or proceedings taken in the course
of the main action are not the proper subjects of any counterclaim. Examples of
this type of claim would be actions for libel contained in the pleadings and actions
for malicious prosecution in bringing the main action. See Slaff v. Slaff, 151
F.Supp. 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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the counterclaim is compulsory and must be pleaded in the first suit or it
is barred. 0 Rule 13 (b) provides in effect that claims not arising out of
the same transaction or occurrence shall be permissive and may be pleaded
either as a counterclaim or in an independent action. Rule 13 (c) , like
the code provision it supplants, states that a counterclaim need not defeat
the recovery sought by the plaintiff and the relief may be of a different
kind.
The chief implication of the new rules is apparent; an attorney must
now be very certain about the status of any counterclaim that might exist
in his client's favor. It is now possible to be barred from bringing an
action on the claim if the court determines the claim was compulsory under
13 (a) and should have been pleaded in a previous action.
Theoretically the pleading of permissive counterclaims should cause
little trouble as the language of rules 13 (b) and (c) is substantially that of
the statute they replace involving permissive counterclaims. However, the
line between what is a permissive counterclaim and what is a compulsory
counterclaim is rather ill-defined. The practical effect is that the careful
attorney will treat most counterclaims as compulsory in order to insure that
rule 13 (a) will not come into operation to bar a subsequent action.
The problem that now confronts the Wyoming attorney who, for his
own good reasons, would rather not plead a claim as a counterclaim is
whether his claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence. The
term is vague and offers little help in itself. The cases do little to clarify
this vagueness. The test used universally in the federal courts is the
test of logical relevancy, or, restated: Are the two claims (main claim and
counterclaim) logically related?1 1 Under this test it has been held that
"immediateness of connection" is not required 12 and that an absolute
3
identity of facts is not essential.'
The following have been held to be compulsory counterclaims under
this test: claims arising out of the same automobile accident;' 4 a counterclaim alleging the use of confidential information in an action to obtain
a patent; 15 a counterclaim for declaration of the validity of the defendant's
trade-mark in an action for registration of the plaintiff's trade-mark; 16 a
counterclaim for damages to freight in an action for recovery of freight
charges; 17 a counterclaim for a penalty for usury in an action to recover
on a note.' 8
10.

11.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 13 (a) ; two qualifications to this are that such
a claim need not be pleaded if it requires the presence of third parties over whom
the court cannot obtain jurisdiction and if the counterclaim is the subject of
another action already pending.
Rosenthal v. Fowler, 12 F.R.D. 388 (W.D.Mo. 1947), "logical relationship [is]
the sine qua non of compulsoriness"; R.F.C. v. First Nat. Bank of Cody, 17 F.R.D.
397 (D.Wyo. 1955); E. J. Corvette Co. v. Parker Pen Co., 17 F.R.D. 267 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
Lesnik v. Public Industrials Corp., 144 F2d 968 (2d Cir. 1944).
United Artists v. Masterpiece Productions, 221 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1955).
Sinkbeil v. Handler, 7 F.R.D. 92 (D.Neb. 1946).
Nachtman v. Crucible Steel, 165 F.2d 997 (3d Cir. 1948).
Speed Products Inc. v. Tinnerman Products Inc., 222 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1955).
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Musante-Phillips, Inc., 42 F.Supp. 340 (N.D.Cal. 1941).
John R. Alley Co. v. Federal Nat. Bank, 124 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1942).
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The following have been held to be permissive counterclaims: a
counterclaim for damages to the premises in an action for recovery of rent
overcharges; 19 a claim alleging conspiracy under the Clayton Act where
the defendant had brought a prior action for patent infringement;2 0 a
counterclaim for infringement of a patent in an action seeking to have
another patent declared invalid; 21 a counterclaim for work done on two
wells in an action for negligent work on one of them-the counterclaim was
held to be compulsory as to the well that was the subject matter' of the
22
plaintiff's suit and permissive as to the other well.

It is clear from the case law that no rule can be stated that will show
at a glance which are compulsory and which are permissive counterclaims.
There is a rationale available however that will help to determine which
are and which are not compulsory counterclaims. This rationale is implicit in the cases if not explicit: where two claims are so related that a
separate trial of each claim would impose on the parties a duplication of
evidence or effort on substantially the same facts, then as a matter of
policy it will be required that they be tried in one action. This test,
while furnishing a rationale for the distinction between rule 13 (a) and
rule 13 (b) does little to dispel the ill-defined line between the two. The
practical effect of the vague distinction will be to force an attorney to
plead a counterclaim in almost every instance where there is doubt whether
the counterclaim is compulsory or permissive. It would not do to draw
too fine a distinction between 13(a) and 13 (b) and risk the possibility
of being barred from asserting the claim in a subsequent action.
There is a dearth of cases that have actually barred a claim under
rule 13 (a) .23 Most federal cases that have had to decide whether a claim
is compulsory or permissive are cases in which the question arose in connection with jurisdiction, venue, or jury trials. The decisions are still
very much in point however in cases where the question might arise in
connection with the possible barring of an action under 13 (a).
The
reason so few claims have been barred is undobutedly due to the caution
imposed on attorneys by 13 (a) and also to the fact that courts are probably
reluctant to bar a claim if they can sustain it under rule 13 (b) as a permissive counterclaim.
The fact that the possibility of being precluded from bringing an
action exists can be best illustrated by the case of Keller v. Keklikian,24 a
19.
20.

21.
22.
23.
24.

Marks v. Spitz, 4 F.R.D. 348 (D.Mass. 1945).
Douglas v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, 81 F.Supp. 167 (N.D.III. 1948).

In this case the court felt bound, reluctantly to hold that a counterclaim alleging
misuse of a patent could not be barred under rule 13 (a). It felt that the Supreme
Court removed this type of counterclaim from rule 13 (a) on public polciy grounds
in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 64 S.Ct. 268, 88 L.Ed. 376
(1944).
Measurements Corp. v. Ferris Instruments Corp., 159 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1946).
McKnight v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 20 F.R.D. 563 (N.D.W.Va. 1957).
See Wright, Estoppel by Rule: The Compulsory Counterclaim Under Modern
Pleading, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 423 (1954).
Professor Wright has collected the cases
where claims have been barred at page 432.
362 Mo. 919, 244 S.W.2d 1001 (1952).
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comparatively recent Missouri decision which is one of the few cases that
has barred a subsequent action because of failure to file a counterclaim
under 13 (a). In this case, Keklikian filed a suit arising out of an automobile accident. Keller, the defendant, turned the complaint over to his
insurer who entered a stipulation of settlement and the action was dismissed
before trial. Keller then filed a suit arising out of the accident. The court
held that the failure to counterclaim in the first action precluded an
independent action by Keller. This case should serve as a warning not
only to insurance company lawyers, but also to any attorney who would
ignore the changes wrought by the new rules concerning counterclaims.
Another change which will probably result is the effect on the right
to a jury trial where a legal counterclaim is filed in an equitable action.
The law before the adoption of the compulsory counterclaim rule was that
the defendant waived his right to a jury trial by interposing such a counterclaim. 25

The rationale was that the defendant had a choice between

counterclaiming or bringing a separate action, and by choosing to counterclaim he waived the right to a jury trial on the legal issue. The concept
of a compulsory counterclaim upset this rationale which was necessarily
predicated on a voluntary act of the defendant. It is now the rule that
where the counterclaim is compulsory under rule 13 (a) the defendant
does not waive his right to a jury trial by filing a legal counterclaim in an
equitable action. 26 Presumably the waiver rule will still apply to bar a
jury trial where the counterclaim is permissive. This then is one more
instance where Wyoming lawyers and judges will have to enter the jungle
of logical relevancy to determine whether the counterclaim arises out of
the same transaction or occurrence.
The final change to be noted relates to the allowance of a counterclaim by the plaintiff in proper situations. The 1939 statute specifically
limited counterclaims to those existing in favor of the defendant. 27 The
new rules impose no such limitation; the language of rules 13 (a) and (b)
employ the words pleader and pleading. Thus it has been held under this
28
rule that a paintiff may counterclaim to a counterclaim.
In summary it must be stated that the effect of the new rules concerning counterclaims will be to place a burden of greater viligance on the
Wyoming attorney. The existence of compulsory counterclaims and the
difficulty of determining which are compulsory necessarily calls for this
result. However such a result, which in some cases may be harsh, is
neccesary if the desirable policy of avoiding duplication of trials is to be
effectuated in cases where one hearing could just as easily determine both
29
issues and thus avoid unnecessary and expensive litigation.
RONALD M. HOLDAWAY
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Horwitz v. New York Life Ins. Co., 80 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1935); Burns v. Corn
Exchange Nat. Bank, 33 Wyo. 474, 240 Pac. 683 (1925).
Morrison-Knudson Co. v. Wiggins, 13 F.R.D. 304 (D.Alaska 1952); Union Central
Life Ins. Co. v. Burger, 27 F.Supp. 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 3-1313 (1945).
Warren v. Indian Refining Co., 30 F.Supp. 281 (N.D.Ind. 1939); Bethlehem Fabricators Inc. v. John Bowen Co., 1 F.R.D. 274 (D.Mass. 1940).
Marks v. Spitz, 4 F.R.D. 348 (D.Mass. 1945).

